ENGL 306 | Research Paaper Analysis Rough Draft
Erika Zigman
Historical
Students for a Democratic Society
(SDS) were one of the most influential student led organization in the country,
and overall organization in the 1960s. It came from humble beginnings before
its rapid rise to fame, and would suffer a decline almost just as fast. To
understand why SDS was such a significant organization it is important to
understand its emergence and initial policy development, the resources it
exploited to reach national recognition, the issues that it faced (both
internal and external), as well as how SDS dealt with (or failed to deal with)
these issues.
SDS emerged as a branch of the
League for a Democratic Society (LID) in 1960 that was directed specifically
toward students. LID had evolved after the Cold War with a certain set of
beliefs which largely revolved around strong anti-Communism policies, which SDS
was intended to build on but direct to a specific audience (Stone 60). During
its period of inception (Griffen 11), SDS outlined its policies in its
political manifesto, the Port Huron Statement, a few years later (McMillian 87).
It stated SDS’s position as anti-war, anti-communist, anti-nuke, for racial and
economic equality as well as several other important domestic affairs. In
addition to its criticisms of the United States, the Port Huron Statement also
provided potential solutions and ways to go about creating that change, two of
which were nonviolent civil disobedience and participatory democracy (Vickers
75). Participatory democracy involves total participation of individuals within
an organization in the decision-making process (Glazer 23). This structure aimed
at decentralizing the organization of this student movement such that everyone
would have equal access to resources and equal representation (Banello 408).
Although policies and beliefs had
been laid out in the Port Huron Statement, SDS was still searching for its
niche. They developed three different projects in 1964, testing the student
mood and different strategies for channeling it to serve a certain purpose
(Stone 60). The Free Speech Movement (FSM) in Berkeley solved this issue more
than anything else. It was an effort by students to motivate that
administration to lift the ban on campus political activities and the SDS
leaders recognized the opportunity to increase their following and gain
recognition through FSM and pounced (Sale 169). They provided monetary support,
flew speakers over, and typed out multiple bulletins with updates on FSM to be
distributed by chapters (albeit, small ones at the time) across the country.
They were the first organization to respond nationwide to an event whose
significance may not have been fully realized by others yet. FSM caused
students, even those not directly involved in the protest, to start thinking
critically about politics and what was important to them (Vickers 98). Soon
these students started looking around for someone or something to help express
these interests and concerns, and SDS was there to provide that.
SDS experienced a rapid growth in
numbers and donations following the FSM, and a large percentage of these
resources were dedicated to communicating with and educating new and potential
group members. They did this be creating and circulating synopses on political
essays, letters, speeches as well as information about SDS. Nobody published as
much rhetoric as they did, and through their writing they developed new
theories on war, capitalism, civil right and complicity (Sale 354). People
began to look to SDS for theories on change, further legitimizing them.
SDS’s widespread influence was
illustrated by its March on Washington in 1965, with 25,000 people present it
was the largest peace march in America. Even more impressive was the diversity
of its participants: students, adults, blacks, mothers and other groups were
all united under SDSers call to “urge the participation of all those who agree
with us that the war in Vietnam injures both Vietnamese and Americans and
should be stopped.” Unfortunately, this general call to action received
significant negative feedback when domestic communist organizations became
involved, particularly from LID (Sale 177). This year marked SDS’s official
break from its parent organization, and the removal of the exclusion clause
form the Port Huron statement. This policy of de-exclusionism would come back
to haunt SDS in the future.
In the years that followed SDS
faced significant challenges many of which could be traced back to its
structure. SDS was not prepared to handle such explosive growth (Harrison 2).
They received numerous written requests for more literature and information on
how to get involved, but SDS as too disorganized to respond and had nearly
stopped creating literature entirely. New and prospective members were left
uneducated and dissatisfied, easy picking for organizations poaching recruits
from SDS. Therefore, new factions began to develop and clog up debates,
effectively arresting the decision-making process. Two critical examples are
the Kewadin summer convention of 1965 and the 1967 convention (Sale 215). The
former resulted in further decentralization (which would do more long term
damage than worth the short-term benefits) and the missed opportunity to
capitalize on the burgeoning anti-war movement. Although both conventions
failed to develop a strategy for the upcoming year, this would prove
devastating for a massive protest in 1968, which catapulted the mindset from
resistance to revolution.
Now known as the Ten Days campaign, this protest involved
roughly one million students and is the largest protest in the country to date.
The high stakes and time sensitive nature of the protest amplified the existing
problems in SDS, which continued to increase thereafter when membership grew
exponentially. This campaign can be explained with the uprising at Columbia
University as an example of everything that went rights, and more importantly,
everything that went wrong, with SDS in the Ten Days campaign.
SDS’s national organization had proposed that all efforts be
focused on base building, however, the national center was so distant from its
individual chapters that they autonomously decided to participate. This
developed the action faction. With no strategy prepared in advance, the
uprising went through a series of different power struggles, with SDS always on
the losing end (Raskin 256). Despite their limited involvement, SDS received
most of the credit for the protest in Columbia. So much such that SDS became a
household, membership levels exploded and donations came pouring in, and SDS
felt a wealth and recognition never known before.
It was not long after this SDS began to fall apart. The
adoption of radicalism scared away members and potential members, donors and
supporters through the extremely negative portrayal of SDS by the media,
government and even school administrations. This in combination with the severe
repression from the FBI, and rapidly growing factions within SDS (the most
popular was the Progressive Labor Party) resulted in its split in 1969 and the
dissolution of the surviving fragments not long after (Sale 574).
Rhetorical
SDS’s largest issue was forming a
cohesive, collective identity. The collective identity referred to in this
paper can be defined by Polletta as “an individual’s cognitive, moral and
emotional connection with a broader community. It is a perception of a shared
status or relation” (285). Like the movement, a collective identity is not
stagnant, it evolves with the belief’s and grievances of the actors. It is for
this reason, that SDS’s failure to develop a collective identity need be
analyzed with respect to time periods of its existence. First, SDS and its
success in developing a collective identity at its initial phase of recruitment
to contrast with its shortcomings in the following years after a dramatic
change in the movement due to the number and type of individuals involved.
Then, the failure to develop a collective identity will be at the next phase of
decline, but one in which SDS has transition from an organization of protest
and resistance to one of radicalism. Because formation of collective identity
can be based on tactics, it is important to draw that divide as the strategies
differed extremely from resistance to radicalism (Polletta 284). Through this
structured analyses, SDS’s failure to adopt a collective identity due to
structural and strategic failures will become increasingly clear.
In SDS’s initial years the
decentralized participatory democracy drew students to the organization.
Participatory democracy had been proposed in the Port Huron statement as a
structure for social relations within the organization (McMillian 88). As a
small group, it was easily implemented in SDS and allowed deep and personal
conversations in which ideas were discussed respectfully (McMillian 90). This
framework enhanced the feeling of comradery amongst members. For times when the
discussions did get heated and certain groups or individuals felt unheard, SDS
had significant communication channels setup to compensate for that. The
communication channels in SDS served as vehicles for mobilization, that did not
have the appearance of centralization. It is not surprising then, that the
increase in internal issues for SDS correlates with the time that these communication
channels were shut down. The circulation of letters and literature allowed
multiple avenues for expression within the community, and even encouraged
expression of alternate views to enhance everyone’s learning (McMillian 94).
These constant meetings, deep discussions, and open exchange of private letters
to share ideas constantly integrated potential and new members by facilitating
the idea of “us” (Polletta 292).
Despite the incredible success that these strategical and
structural components of SDS yielded initially, they would not prove successful
with the rapid influx of new members. The necessity to develop an identity and
strategy in the face of such extraordinary change would be crucial to asserting
a collective identity in uniting the current members with the new. However, the
new SDS was barely recognizable with the new demographic. This posed a threat
to participatory democracy in two ways: natural oligarchical tendencies and
presence of a heterogeneous mixture. In a large party, an oligarchy will form
naturally to meet the organizational demands that a successful, complex party
requires (Michels 230). A natural order rises from leaders who are necessary to
organize the movement to mobilize it next. Therefore, when curious students
became great SDS activists who became great leaders an elite forms. This is not
only the natural progression of large parties, but of an engaged and dedicated
party member, which is required in a participatory democracy that is always in
session. As opposed to developing a new organizational structure that could
handle a national presence, there were increased demands to decentralize. This
localized power to individual chapters, that were possibly small enough to
function with a participatory democracy, and to remove the elite. The removal
of the organizational heads of SDS had ramifications that were not necessarily
immediately clear. The constant changing of SDS leaders resulted in a national
office that was unable to form strong connections with the increasingly distant
and independent chapters. The increased distance between the national center
and its chapters made it nearly impossible to bridge the gaps and develop
strategies to reform the collective identity.
But it was not just the number of new members that disrupted
the organization of SDS, it was also the type
of people who joined. SDS represented the entire spectrum of people in America,
ranging in race, age, gender and education. Most importantly, these members
that came flooding in did not necessarily align themselves with SDS’s ideology
and policies, this resulted in a heterogeneous
mixture. In a small organization, there are expected to be disputes over
specific policies and minor issues, but the main goals will be the same.
However, in a massive organization with several identifiable factions, many
people have different agendas (Breines 533). This changes a democratic debate,
where opposite sides listen to an argument and respond accordingly, to an
argument where one side simply wants to win (Sale 361). Winning was forcing
your idea onto the opponent, regardless of his/her say. Debate would go on for
hours and make no progress as some is unwilling to change their line (Polletta
293). Even further, it discouraged less involved or quieter individuals from
participating, so that only those with the loudest voices were heard (again,
heading toward an oligarchy). The heterogeneous mixture not only arrested any
progress that SDS might make, preventing any tactical formation, but it also
alienated many of the other groups who were not feeling represented. The true challenge
that SDS faced was that many of the true SDSers recognized these factions,
however, there was little that they could do about it. SDS would have to betray
its non-exclusion policy to remove these factions, and destroy the identity
that SDS stood for.
The decentralization led to disorganization and resulted in
a select few pulling SDS from resistance to full blown radicalization (Breines
540). The government’s slow response and ineffectiveness of nonviolent civil
disobedience brought about a radical consciousness, that America was past
reform (Stryker 89). Although radicalization may have had the positive desired
effects short term, radicalization would not serve as an appropriate tactic to achieve
SDS’s long term goals (Breines 529). This is partially because justifications
for radicalization are based on false pretenses. For example, the belief that
the problem is simply one of (abuse of) power. Albeit, that may play a role,
but there are many other less tangible issues behind it. To believe these
issues stem from one evil is a naïve theory (Glazer 16).
The radical techniques at Columbia, and those which
followed, alienated a significant portion of SDS’s support base. Because of the
decentralization, individual chapters were making decisions on strategies in
the name of SDS, largely without the support or knowledge of SDS (particularly
the efforts made by the more radical groups). In addition, the media, which was
vehemently opposed to SDS following the new radical position, painted the
entire organization as radical based off on the actions of a few chapters. The
actions of the radicals alienated the less extreme members, alumni, and many
other organizations. Even those who tried to follow the ethical ad non-violent
pathway to creating change were actively ostracized (Sale 458). This resulted
in increased representation of the factions within SDS, giving them more influence
(or a louder voice) in the conventions.
Despite
the success SDS has experienced, it failed repeatedly to deal with the uprising
disillusionment and internal issues that it faced (alienation, factionalism,
lack of education, structurelessness). Although it is an organization based on
decentralization, a collective identity would have been an important step in
strengthening SDS and possibly preventing some of these mobilization issues
from destroying SDS. These flaws caused SDS to disperse long before its
official divide in 1969.
Questions:
1.
Does all my historical context seem
relevant and, on the other hand, are there some areas that need more
explanation?
2. Is there any part of my paper that seems
redundant or has poor organization?
3. What could use some work in my
introduction and concluding paragraph?
Works Cited
Benello, George
C. “Participatory Democracy and the Dilemma of Change.” The New Left: A Collection of Essays, Priscilla Long, 1969, pp.
404-419.
Breines,
Winifred. “Whose New Left?” The
Journal of American History, vol. 75, no. 2, 1988, pp. 528–545.
Glazer, Nathan.
"The New Left and Its Limits." The
Radical Left: The Abuse of Discontent, William P. Gerberding, 1970, pp.
11-30.
Harrison,
Benjamin T. "The Waning of the American Student Peace Movement of the
Sixties." Peace Research 21.3 (1989): 1-15. Web.
McMillian,
John. “‘Our Founder, the Mimeograph Machine’: Participatory Democracy in
Students for a Democratic Society's Print Culture.” Journal for the Study of Radicalism,
vol. 2, no. 2, 2008, pp. 85–110.
Polletta,
Francesca, and James M. Jasper. “Collective Identity and Social Movements.” Annual Review of Sociology,
vol. 27, 2001, pp. 283–305.
Raskin,
Eleanor. "The Occupation of Columbia University: April 1968." Journal of American Studies 19.2 (1985): 255-60. Web.
Sale,
Kirkpatrick. SDS. Random House, New
York. 1971.
Stone, Dale.
“SDS and the ‘Iron Law of Oligarchy.’” Kansas
Journal of Sociology, vol. 8, no. 1, 1972, pp. 59–64.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/23255150.
Stryker, Sean
D. “Knowledge and Power in the Students for a Democratic Society, 1960-1970.” Berkeley Journal of Sociology,
vol. 38, 1993, pp. 89–138.
Vickers, George
R. The Formation of the New Left: The Early Years. Lexington Books, 1975.
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