Final Research Paper

“It simply must have been heard in this country, sometime, that democracy is nothing if it is not dangerous.” Carl Oglesby, the fifth president of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), concluded his speech to a deafening applause from an audience over 200,000 people in the March on Washington in 1965. Sale describes it as “a devastating performance” that attacked corporate liberalism and championed democratic ideals (Sale 244). Roughly three years, an SDSer would speak and receive a response equal in unanimity and excitement. Bernadine Dohrn was running for office in SDS after the protest at Columbia when asked her political beliefs, to which she responded, “I consider myself a revolutionary communist.” She was elected without opposition (Sale 451). It would suffice to say, that a lot had changed in this short time span. SDS had a national membership of two thousand spread across eighty chapters prior to Oglesby’s speech (Sale 193); according to surveys by the Educational Testing Service, SDS boasted approximately 140,000 members and up to 395 chapters (Sale 447). Despite this explosive growth, SDS remained, in another sense, very much the same. It was still very much a loosely constructed, student-led organization symbolic of the New Left movement. And just as it had been in its humble beginning, SDS was still governed by participatory democracy.

Participatory democracy has been around for a long time, with origins that can be traced back to Ancient Greece in the eighth and seventh century but did not become a political theory with recognizable attributes until the publication of Political Parties by Robert Michels in 1911. Even then, it remained somewhat ill-defined and was not fully articulated until James Fishkin’s development of deliberative democracy (Hicks 227). Participatory democracy is a form of deliberative democracy, in that it does not necessarily satisfy all three desirable traits of an ideal system of direct (i.e. pure) democracy, but may satisfy only two. These three traits are referred to as the trilemma, and are often very challenging to deliver all at once. They are participation, deliberation and equality; participatory democracy need only satisfy the former two. Participation is characterized by widespread involvement in the decision-making process by all affected individuals, deliberation is the logical discussion and weighing of arguments according to provided evidence, and equality is the assurance that all affected individuals have equal opportunity to argue their stake. Equality is not a necessary component in participatory democracy, due to restrictions imposed by limited availability of resources (i.e. time, money), and its presence is primarily determined by the size of the participating population. Given its long history, there have been significant theoretical analyses on participatory democracy. However, because transcendence of the trilemma for mass organizations would require reforms that are both high in number and radical in nature, very few modern examples exist and have been analyzed. Such analyses could provide us with a better understanding of the context and variables necessary to either transcend the trilemma, or ensure equality without betraying the other components of the trilemma while remaining more involved than representative democracy.

This article analyzes the emerging necessity of organization over democracy in a rapidly growing movement practicing participatory democracy: SDS. In particular, it will analyze how efforts to strictly adhere to ideologies which yielded success in an earlier context may result in betrayal of those same ideals in another. In the case of SDS these ideologies include, but are not limited to, participatory democracy. This piece contends that democracy must give way to organization in an increasingly complex network of relationships, goals and influence in an organization.

To explore the efficacy of SDS in terms of its ability to balance democracy and organization, this article incorporates two literatures: social movement studies and organizational theory. Although political sociology is relevant to this topic, all political theories used in this article (i.e. political process theory) fall within the umbrella term of social movement studies for the purpose of this article. This analysis adopts the contingency theory which, in the context of a social movement, claims there is no best way to organize a movement, lead an organization, or make decisions. Rather, the best course of action is dependent on the internal and external context. Using Griffin’s terms and the historical context relevant to SDS, we can divide the 1960s into the three phases of development: a period of inception (1960 – 1965), a period of rhetorical crisis (1965 – 1968) and a period of consummation (1968-1970).

Griffin defines the period of inception as a period when “the roots of a pre-existing sentiment, nourished by interested rhetoricians, begin to flower into public notice” (Griffin 11). For SDS this period emerged from a period of consummation, it’s parent organization, League for Industrial Democracy (LID). SDS was developed as a youth branch of LID in 1960. LID’s influence over the student population was waning, and SDS was formed to combat that by specifically targeting students for recruitment and increasing involvement in campus protests (Isserman 168).

SDS inherited some ideologies from its parent organization, but it developed some new ones as well. These were all outlined in the Port Huron Statement. This was SDS’s manifesto, and it would become the manifesto of the New Left as well (Isserman 169). Although many members of the early SDS were educated and involved in current events, very few had participated in a protest before, let alone organized one. Agreeing on policy is can be challenging, but strategizing is even more difficult (Friedman 6). So the early structure of SDS was not only suited for their political beliefs, but their needs as well. They launched three different projects to test themselves. Naïve students could participate in protests to learn through experience. Then, after gaining experience, the students could participate in open discussions to listen and learn from the experiences of their peers (Friedman 5). Or, the information could be distributed through the vast communication channels that were unique to SDS. These communication channels served as vehicles for mobilization, that did not have the appearance of centralization. It is not surprising then, that the increase in internal issues for SDS correlates with the time that these communication channels were shut down. The circulation of letters and literature allowed multiple avenues for expression within the community, and even encouraged expression of alternate views to enhance everyone’s learning (McMillian 94). These constant meetings, deep discussions, and open exchange of private letters to share ideas constantly integrated potential and new members by facilitating the idea of “us” (Polletta 292). They were all students of protest, and by learning and sharing, whether though face to face discussion or written letters distributed in the communication channels, a feeling of solidarity began to develop. Participatory democracy on this scale was particularly effective. It was carried out spontaneously, face to face and one on one. There was a mutual respect between the rhetors, and the intimate nature of their interactions strengthened their bonds. But they still were not large, wealthy or connected enough to become a leading force of the student movement. SDS’s first opportunity happened September 14, 1964 on the campus of UC Berkeley.

The Free Speech Movement (FSM) began when the administration at UC Berkeley announced that organizing and soliciting funds for off-campus political organizations would prohibited on campus (Sale 162). This was an important moment for SDS, but not for necessarily tangible or obvious reasons. The protest itself wasn’t particularly exciting of complex. It lasted a little over three months, involved sit-ins and strikes, and resulted in another announcement the administration indicated removal of the prohibition. This was important for SDS in two ways. First of all, it marked a change in attitude in the students. Secondly, SDS was the first organization to respond. It made them the ideal organization for the students to turn to. And so, the success of the FSM, as it pertains to SDS, could be seen almost immediately. But this was a small movement, to really test SDS’s abilities we would need a bigger protest.

The March on Washington yield several results that are important for a successful movement: increased number, higher donations and widespread influence. Unfortunately, results were limited to short term successes only, and the long-term problems grew increasingly large. One of the most prominent contributors to students’ disillusionment is heterogeneity. The heterogeneous nature of the movement can be attributed to the structure’s organization. Early SDS did not have the resources to recruit extensively on the national level, therefore recruitment was carried out by local chapters. The early chapters were often developed in areas that saw more political activity because these areas were more likely have protests SDS could participate in, were more likely to respond to calls to action from SDS, and had better recruitment opportunities. It was not difficult to incorporate these kinds of recruits into the organization, as many of them shared ideals with current members. However, it was when SDS began drawing attention from universities outside of the East, people who smoked marijuana, adults, high school students that it began to experience issues of heterogeneity (Sale 204). Of the two characteristics, early SDSers had going for them (formal education and experience), the newer recruits possessed neither. In the past, a difference in opinion had often been beneficial to SDS, especially in practicing participatory democracy; an opposing view was a learning opportunity. However, the new demographic posed a threat to participatory democracy as a result of what Michels refers to as ‘The Iron Law of Oligarchy.’ In a large party, an oligarchy will form naturally to meet the organizational demands that a successful, complex party requires (Michels 230). A natural order rises from leaders who are necessary to organize the movement to mobilize it next. Therefore, when curious students became great SDS activists who became great leaders an elite forms. This is not only the natural progression of large parties, but of an engaged and dedicated party member, which is required in a participatory democracy that is always in session. Such widely varying points at a point when SDS was loosely structured with vague goals after massive growth would thrust SDS into a period of rhetorical crisis.

               According to Griffin, a period of rhetorical crisis is a time when the opposition to the rhetorician(s) is successful in irreversibly upsetting the balance between the groups (Griffin 11). For SDS, this began in the summer of 1965. Albeit, issues within the organization did begin to emerge prior to this, however, these long-term failures were masked by short term success and were amenable to most members. It wasn’t until the Kewadin Convention that disillusionment with the organization became apparent, and remained an issue up until the SDS National Convention two years later (Sale 358). The nature of these two conventions were extremely similar in that they presented a heterogeneous population nearly impossible of representation, little effective policy change, and an overall shift in attitude from reform to resistance.

               The organizational issues brought about by SDS’s heterogeneity were no different than those observed leading up to the commencement of the period of rhetorical crisis. What has changed is the organization of the disaffected youths. Unlike SDS’s policy and strategy, the confused newer members of SDS did not remain stagnant when SDS no longer appeared capable effectuating change. Just as the students at Berkeley had done following the FSM, SDSers began searching for someone who could help them. They found the answer within SDS, but not with SDS itself. The growth in numbers following the transition from reform to resistance, alongside SDS’s struggle to reconnect its recruits, resulted in dramatic increase in factionalism. Some of these stemmed from SDS, blossoming when SDS experienced massive strategical movement deficits, while some factions sent leaders to SDS to cherry pick fresh or potential members off the fading organization.

The inability to create significant influential changes in policy can again be attributed to the heterogeneity of the organization. It was impossible to represent such a diverse organization, and as a result participatory democracy became a battle of resources; who could shout the loudest, who could commit the most time, who could coerce and persuade. This resulted in an inability to commit to one issue as a goal to change (i.e. the antiwar movement, civil rights, poverty). Whereas the one thing these diverse sects could agree on was decentralization. The decentralization led to disorganization and resulted in a select few pulling SDS from resistance to full blown radicalization (Breines 540). The government’s slow response and ineffectiveness of nonviolent civil disobedience brought about a radical consciousness, that America was past reform (Stryker 89). Although radicalization may have had the positive desired effects short term, radicalization would not serve as an appropriate tactic to achieve SDS’s long term goals (Breines 529). This is partially because justifications for radicalization are based on false pretenses. For example, the belief that the problem is simply one of (abuse of) power. Albeit, that may play a role, but there are many other less tangible issues behind it. To believe these issues stem from one evil is a naïve theory (Glazer 16).

SDS’s failure to respond to the disillusionment experienced by its members ultimately resulted in a shift from Griffin’s period of rhetorical crisis to the period of consummation. He defines the period of consummation as the time when the major of rhetoricians “abandon their efforts.” The possible explanations for this are: the opinion has been created and won, they do not perservence will yield any tangible results, or because move on to a different interest. The beginning of the consummation period can be made very clear through analysis of the protest at Columbia in the summer of 1965.

The protest at Columbia was part of a larger protest organized by SDS, called the Ten Days Campaign. The Ten Days Campaign involved roughly one million students and is the largest protest in the country to date. Students who were initially participating in forms of civil disobedience escalated to siege of the campus with takeover of several buildings and the capture of faculty hostages. The protesters’ demands were eventually agreed on by the academic board and the protest was, for the most part, considered a success. However, this period marked a change in mentality of many SDSers. This was the first major victory for the organization in a while, as their picketing and strikes leading up to it in the months prior had yielded no results. Columbia made it very clear to some SDSers that they were past the point of reform. They needed to restructure, and to do that they needed more aggressive and revolutionary tactics (Sale 440). The high stakes and time sensitive nature of the protest amplified the existing problems in SDS, which continued to increase thereafter when membership grew exponentially. SDS’s national organization had proposed that all efforts be focused on base building, however, the national center was so distant from its individual chapters that the local chapters autonomously decided to participate. This developed the action faction. With no strategy prepared in advance, the uprising went through a series of different power struggles, with SDS always on the losing end (Raskin 256). Despite their limited involvement, SDS received most of the credit for the protest in Columbia. So much credit, such that SDS became a household name. Membership levels exploded and donations came pouring in, and SDS felt a wealth and recognition never known before. It was not long after this SDS began to fall apart.

               As SDS began to fall apart, it’s factions began to fall together. Most notable, was the Weathermen. It is the common consensus that the Weathermen had their origins in the Columbia protest. Mark Rudd, radical SDSer who led the Columbia protest, was one of the faction’s founders. He was the one who went to the National Office and proposed more radical strategy, and was abruptly turned down (Ellis 110). Because of the organizations abrupt shut down on the idea of pursuing further revolutionary tactics, the Weathermen needed to garner a larger following before they could take actions independent of SDS. Creating a new organization within SDS would not be difficult, as many members were already beginning to feel discontent with the movement, but first they had to make their presence known to the masses.

Part of SDS’s initial success is the result of the elaborate and innovative communication channels within the movement. Opportunities to participate and express opinions were abound in the form of bulletins, newsletters, essays and even letters that were mass produced and passed from person to person within chapters (McMillian 88). This open access to information was exemplative of a true democracy, and these diverse channels of communication allowed for rapid dissemination of information usually characteristic of a centralized political party (Michels 32). It was for these reasons that the Weathermen decided to raise awareness and cherry pick from SDS by piggy backing off their system by infiltrating the New Left Notes, SDS’s newspaper. They published their position paper (manifesto) titled “You don’t need a Weatherman to know which way the wind blows” in the paper distribute to all delegate at SDS’s national convention in the summer of 1969, just a few months prior to the split.

The manifesto was plagued with pop-culture references in addition to the title line from Bob Dylan’s 1965 song, such as “Look out kid” and “keep your nose clean” (Sale 559). These lyrics resonated with the target audience, successfully establishing shared interests and like backgrounds between the intended reader and the authors of the paper. The choice of lyrics and their arrangement within the paper spoke to Americans who were disillusioned with the American system and government, appealing to the antiauthoritarian and independent natures of the students. And the paper was concentrated specifically on students, or at least the population included in that age demographic. It was that generation that grew up with these songs and artists, and knew and respected them the most. Respect was key in the revolutionaries’ choice of musical artists, whether they knew it or not. In trusting and respecting the artists’ whose work was included in this manifesto, the ethos of the authors was dramatically enhanced, giving credibility to the paper.

Although the establishment of credibility was not particularly necessary in this case. The authors of this manifesto, and the original creators of the Weathermen, were well known and respected participants in SDS. These activists had seniority, some of them had been involved in SDS since the free speech movement at Berkeley in 1965, and therefore many of the audience members they reached out to had already interacted with these activists to some extent. They were also diligent members of the organization. A key characteristic of SDS was decentralization and lack of an elite, but a natural tendency for leadership forms as interested students become good activists who then make great leaders. They were involved in different chapters of SDS and were regarded as experienced, knowledgeable and successful members who were sometimes treated as celebrity types (Alimi 101).

This manifesto gained support not only through providing a theoretical expression and resource for individuals beginning to experience a sense of revolution, but also by subtly attacking the position of another burgeoning faction in SDS: the Progressive Labor Party (PL). The PL was known for their clearly outlined methodologies and policies, which had attracted many members of SDS who grew frustrated with the disorganized and ill-defined tactical and organizational structure of SDS. However, following the emergence of a new revolutionary spirit from the 1968 Columbia protest, the distaste for rigid outline was spreading. The Weathermen recognized this and pounced before the remaining members of SDS could regain their lost followers. The statement “you don’t need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows” was a sharp criticism of the PL. It expressed that the revolutionary feeling was instinctive and intuitive, that its potential to create change was only limited by the harsh rules enforced by the PL. There was no need for claims or evidence to back this inferred denouncement of the PL, as reformers become anarchists there is a natural tendency to shrink away from centralization or organized leadership (Michels 28). On this level, the Weatherman statement was attractive on even a subconscious level to its target audience.

The only apparent shortcoming of the Weatherman statement was that it used much of the language from the Old Left (Sale 560). The Old Left revolved around ideologies and policies created because of the Cold War and strong feelings of anti-communism. The New Left deserted this centralized organizational structure for a loosely defined democracy in the 1960s. New Left organizations generally scorned or publicly shamed any theory baring semblance to the Old Left, and SDS was no exception. However, after experiencing a period of disillusionment, a successful movement will respond to those attitudes and evolve accordingly. The Old Left ideologies presented by the Weatherman policy paper came at just the right time for it to be excepted by the disaffected members of SDS.

Although unsatisfied with SDS and/or PL, the individuals who were still active members were committed. Many long-term members can be divided as either individuals who are diligent participants and those who participate out of habit. Considering the risks faced by participating (SDS was under thorough investigation by the FBI, the media vehemently attacked the activists, and school administrators had begun revoking scholarships of identified activists) and the SDS’s continuing failure to meet the expectations of the members, the organization consisted primarily of the former rather than the latter. The Weathermen therefore appealed to a sense of duty in the manifesto. They declared that the youth of America had a special role in this movement, a position that only they could fill, to aid in the liberation of black communities and denouncement of the war in Vietnam (Sale 560). However successful this call to action was in inciting participation, it would have been overwhelmed by the number of non-radicals in the organization had it been proposed years earlier and quickly snuffed out. The timing and methodology of the Weatherman statement was crucial to its success in garnering a support in the SDS organization.

               It is informative, analyzing the organizational structural challenge of a fading democratic protest agent through a theoretical lens which had yet to be developed in the period of their protest. It is curious to think how successful SDS might have been, if there would be any change at all, had they the tools we have today. In this article, I explained the emerging necessity of organization over democracy in SDS, a rapidly growing movement practicing participatory democracy. My focus was on how attempts to strictly adhere to ideologies which yielded success in an earlier context may result in betrayal of those same ideals in another. In the case of SDS these ideologies include, but are not limited to, participatory democracy. SDS’s policies of decentralization, participatory democracy and antiexclusionism functioned well within the smaller sized organization and allowed it to develop inclusive, protests on a very large scale, like the March on Washington. Because the 1960s were a tumultuous time in America, with calls for reform and rights coming from all different social groups, an antiexclusion policy would likely be the most effective organizational methodology to organize quickly and make a statement through size. In this sense, SDS was able to adapt new ideologies based on the context of the time; as LID had encourage SDS to adopt its anti-exclusion policy following its branching off. However, SDS’s adherence to its other original ideologies prevented it from evolving with its intended audience, keeping an organizational structure intended to be loose a free-flowing to a rigid and unmoving structure.

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